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What is evident to everybody, but what many officials
often do not dare to spell out, is that EMU is a – necessary,
to be sure – socio-economic experiment. Regrettably, the
credibility of EMU is seriously endangered by official
voices omitting to emphasize this fact.
A convincing and more credible strategy would
emphasize the following elements: (1) EMU contains
risks and opportunities; (2) and so does the world without
EMU; (3) Europe undergoes fundamental changes even
without EMU, changes which may involve temporary
welfare losses; (4) the potential losses from reforms can be
minimized, if EMU brings the expected benefits; (5) if not,
the situation will not be worse than without EMU. In
theoretical terms: the convincing argument is not that
EMU cannot go wrong and will make everybody better
off. What it would be advisable to emphasize is its potential
to help bring about the necessary changes by making
reforms less painful and by making the social and economic
costs of the changes manageable!
It goes without saying that, under the circumstances
outlined above, the necessary ingredients to make EMU
‘tick’ and make it acceptable to the peoples of Europe – the
building of consensus on common goals and objectives,
common strategies and actions, and the right models of
integration – will not be easy to create.
In what follows, I will argue that what is much more
important than the widely discussed and the selectively
emphasized economic aspects is the politics of EMU.
Rather than discussing at length the significance of
economic variables, such as deficits, debt, inflation or
interest rates, measured in precise figures, what should be
discussed is common European interests and ideals. What
is crucial is the convergence of policy models, of the beliefs
in the minds of policy makers, and the ideas of social
groups and the general public as to where Europe should
go from here.
It appears as if, despite lipservice to the contrary, (a)
national positions with regard to EMU still diverge widely
in models, beliefs and interests, and (b) often EMU is
‘exploited’ through ‘scapegoating’, i.e. by putting the
blame for domestic austerity measures on the EMU as a
European undertaking. This, of course, creates legitimacy
problems and causes a lack of popularity vis-à-vis a
common European currency amongst the national
electorates of Europe.
2. Belief Differences and Conflicts of Interests
2.1 Convergence – What Convergence?
As is well known, after a decision by the EU Heads of
States and Government in April 1998, EMU is to commence
on 1 January 1999 with the irrevocable fixing of exchange
rates of those countries found eligible to join a monetary
union on the basis of the so-called convergence criteria.*
Half a year earlier, the European System of Central Banks
1. The Challenge
At first glance and in the general public’s perception, the
plan for and the pros and cons of European Monetary
Union (EMU) appear to be derived from the purported
dismal and often inconclusive discipline of economics. In
the face of an, as yet, incomplete European Common
Market, confronted with growing global competition and
due to serious economic problems in Europe, such as
unemployment and structural inertia, the creation of a
common currency for Europe seems indispensable to its
proponents and an incorrect strategy to its opponents.
At second glance, EMU is much more ambitious and
appears to be part of a far-reaching political strategy of
integration: in the course of its history, the EU has gone
through different phases emphasizing different areas of
integration. The period between 1957 and 1968, when the
members of the then-EEC established their customs union,
can be characterized as the phase of trade-driven integration
(free movement of  goods). After a considerable slow-
down in integration efforts in the 1970s (mainly due to the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the two oil
crises), there was renewed momentum in the 1980s based
on  factor-driven integration (free movement of capital
and labour). These developments were accompanied by
ever closer cooperation and integration in a whole series of
primarily national policy areas, such as taxation, budgetary,
regional, social, environmental, industrial and other
policies. The 1990s, eventually, have been characterized
by what one might call money-driven integration, as laid
down in the provisions for EMU in the Maastricht Treaty
on European Union. The logical continuation of these
long term developments may well imply the striving for
Social Union, Fiscal Union and Political Union. In this
context it is obvious that the future of European integration
will crucially depend on the success or failure of EMU
which is due to commence in 1999.
Unfortunately, the EU is presently being faced not
only with serious challenges such as enlargement, reform
of the institutions, its fiscal constitution and the distribution
of the budgetary burden among the Member States. It is
also subject to a deep crisis of legitimacy. This crisis may
be caused partly by the EU’s apparent inability to deal with
the major political and economic problems of the continent
and partly because Europe seems too distant to the citizens,
incomprehensible and intransparent, and characterized by
a lack of vision.
Under these – not exactly favourable – conditions, any
policies designed to promote the EMU idea must be
considered as extremely sensitive. However, during the
past two years or so, there appears to be a tendency to
oversell – and this might carry the unintended consequence
of  overkilling – the EMU undertaking. The promotion
strategies – rather than emphasizing the special political
features of EMU – are often rightly criticized as being
designed like commercials for consumer products.17
consisting of the European Central Bank (ECB – the
decision-making institution) and the National Central
Banks – the operating arms of the ECB – will be established.
A single European currency, the ‘EURO’, will be introduced
as a bookkeeping currency as of 1999 and is intended to
replace the national currencies (notes and coins) as legal
tender as of 2002.
Contrary to some official pronouncements, the selection
of the group of countries to participate in EMU will require
much more than just a look at the 1997 statistics, in order
to check which countries fulfill the entry criteria on the
spot. This is linked with two problems: (a) the formulation
of the legal text in the Maastricht Treaty leaves quite some
leeway for divergent interpretations; (b) the criteria do not
exactly betray a compelling economic logic (Buiter et al
1994; de Grauwe 1994). Therefore, they will most probably
be interpreted as first proxies and they will have to be
complemented by a well-balanced consideration of
economic and political factors. Effects on export markets
in the non-participating countries as well as existing
structures of cooperation (such as the Belgium-
Luxembourg monetary union) and political sensitivities
(e.g. in Italy and Spain) will certainly have to be taken into
account. A politically driven – bargaining – process rather
than purely economic considerations will then determine
the decision.
If this reasoning is correct, the issue arises as to what
functions the convergence criteria really fulfill. Standard
arguments hold that if there is a sufficient degree of
convergence among national economies, they will neither
be subject to asymetric shocks nor will they require
diversified economic policy measures (Gros 1996).
Therefore, a sufficient (whatever that is) degree of
convergence will make it possible to run a joint monetary
(and economic) policy for the whole of the Union-to-be. In
the eyes of the economist the EU is, admittedly, not yet an
optimal currency area, but it will be able to perform as an
advantageous currency area  (Commission 1990). Of
course, this requires a careful selection of structurally
close or similar national economies. Any selection will
also make it necessary to solve the ‘insider-outsider’
problem: how to restrict the effect of the reaction of those
Member States not found eligible to join the first round of
EMU.
The crucial word above is ‘possible’. Whether the
conduct of a joint optimal economic policy is plausible or
even probable depends on other conditions. Siebert (1997)
recently pointed out that a Monetary Union would require
near-perfect agreement on the philosophy on which a
common economic and monetary policy is to be founded.
In the same vein, he argues that a coherent and jointly
accepted paradigm of economic explanation is also an
indispensible prerequisite. Gretschmann and Kotz (1997)
argue that the creating of politico-economic
Wahlverwandtschaften (chosen relatives), which is  an
indispensable precondition for EMU, requires much more
than what is laid down in the provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty and its recent complements like the ‘stability pact’.
If the necessary conditions are not in place, the
probability of conflicts over divergent interpretations,
assumptions, philosophies and – ultimately – policies will
rise sharply in an EMU, no matter what the hard economic
criteria suggest. Even if countries have committed
themselves to a common set of rules – like the Maastricht
Treaty – they may tend to defect and renege once EMU is
in place, provided there is no, or too little, convergence in
the minds of decision makers.
2.2 Model Uncertainty and Disparate Beliefs
As analysed in the literature on policy coordination in the
late 80s (for an instructive overview see: Bryant 1995),
difficulties can be attributed to four main factors:
– there are different national constraints on the policy
instruments available (limited domain);
– there is disagreement about the effects (size and degree)
of specific policy changes on policy targets (differences
in beliefs);
– there are cross-border differences in the degree of
(inter-)dependence (differences in spill-over effects);
– there are different models of how national economies
and the global economy work (model uncertainties).
Among these factors it is the second and the last which
are intertwined and which seem to be of particular salience:
decision-makers usually have only limited knowledge
about the functioning of their national economies. They
know even less about the working of the global economy.
This means they are faced with the problem of having to
decide between competing models, the properties and
premises of which they hardly understand. This is already
a bedeviling problem at national level. It will be even
harder to solve and more complicated at international
level.
The key EMU beliefs are both of an economic and a
political character Dyson (1994:316). Below, I have
enumerated the most important and disputed beliefs about
EMU:
– the belief that fixed exchange rates are superior to
floating ones;
– the belief that the long-term costs of devaluation to
competitiveness outweigh the benefits;
– the belief in the virtues of unconditional pursuit of
price stability;
– the belief in the significance of the gains from
eliminating transaction costs of a multiple currency
regime;
– the belief in the superior benefits of economic policy
coordination;
– the belief in the efficient workings of liberalized
financial markets;
– the belief in the superiority of an independent Central
Bank;
– the belief in the advantages of tying the hands of
national monetary policy;
– the belief that EMU provides an efficient means of
controlling the power of Germany;
– the belief that the blueprint for EMU can be
implemented without any unintended or
counterproductive political side-effects or social costs,
etc.
Of course the degree to which individual Member
States subscribe to such beliefs varies widely, and
consequently their individual commitment and willingness
to enter into the EMU process and to accept the structural
constraints of an EMU regime are by no means the same.
Taking this gulf into consideration, what then is the
real worth of the Maastricht criteria to which politics in
Europe so often refers? At first glance they seem
meaningless and even intrinsically worthless, since they18
will not be able to avoid deep policy differences among
EMU members. They make joint policy optimization
possible, but only to the extent that covergence of beliefs
already exists.
To be even more explicit: The ongoing argument
about the deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP, the issue as to
whether three percent is 3,0% or 3,5% or otherwise is
absolutely misleading. The figures are nothing but
indicators of the beliefs, of the willingness to follow a
generally accepted policy-model, a symbol for joint, non-
defective policy behaviour in a Monetary Union.
Therefore, in order to make sense, the criteria require
to be reinterpreted: their primary purpose seems to be that
they carry some informational value. They may be able to
reveal the true preferences, commitments and beliefs of
the individual potential EMU Member States. They are
intended to serve as an, admittedly imperfect, proxy for
creating rational expectations with regard to future
economic decision-making of the partner countries. This
way, they are a safeguard to optimize mutual (dis)trust and
to decide on one’s own willingness to commit national
interests to the common cause of EMU (Winckler 1995).
Their major function is to serve as a signalling device!
3. EMU’s Main Political Problem: Scapegoating
The main problem with EMU’s popularity can be found in
the fact that many Member States’ governments have
exploited and instrumentalized EMU commitments in
order to implement unpopular and austere domestic
economic policies in a politically cost-efficient way. Such
policies, which would have to be conducted anyway, even
without EMU, can be enforced much more easily by
blaming a supranational body or regime, i.e. the EU. In the
framework of the EU, so the argument goes, a country has
to comply – willingly or unwillingly – even with
undesirable decisions imposed on them externally. This
argument is often used by national policy-makers to deflect
negative social and political reactions of the losers from
the introduction of a particular policy.
This strategy of externalizing domestic legitimacy
costs can be called ‘scapegoating’. It is exactly this pattern
that permeates also the EMU approach. In almost all EU
Member States it has been extremely difficult indeed to
marshal the domestic political support necessary for
implementing unpopular economic measures, such as
savings in public budgets, cut-backs in welfare expenditure
or deficit reduction and tax reform. The political resistance
from vested interests made it very costly to push reforms
through. Commitment to EMU as well as compliance with
other measures decided in an intergovernmental or
supranational institution like the EU, facilitates the taking
of unpopular decisions. Membership of such institutions
is rational and beneficial -amongst other things – because
(a) it allows domestic politics to shift legitimacy losses
onto third parties and (b) it furnishes arguments and
excuses.
But scapegoating not only helps export political costs,
it also contributes to importing pressure to change. Such
pressure may be necessary in cases where national
economies are no longer able to reform themselves, to
break rigidities and overcome inertia. Also, from this
vantage point, EMU carries some benefits: As several
authors have pointed out, EMU – due to the loss of the
exchange-rate as an instrument for bolstering adjustment
processes – will lead to more competitive pressure, more
mobility, more comparability of prices and wages etc..
Although not all participating countries will frankly
subscribe to these objectives, it gives them options which
would otherwise not exist. These options would be difficult
to create without an external scapegoat: As Marks et al
(1995) observe, Member States’ political executives can
hide behind decisions made by the ECB, the Council or the
Commission. They can fend off domestic opposition and
defuse dissatisfaction by arguing that they are duty bound
to adjust to arrangements they cannot change unilaterally.
This way, EMU may be used as a garbage can (Ostrup
1995) into which Member States ‘voluntarily’ toss
unpopular economic policies in order to avoid their
electorates holding them accountable for unpopular actions.
Even though scapegoating helps promote domestic
economic reforms and externalizes the political costs
incurred, it is not without cost itself: As a matter of fact,
externalizing costs onto an international player or regime
does not reduce total costs but just shifts, i.e. redistributes,
them. If this were to involve diffusion over several parties,
it could be considered beneficial due to burden sharing
and lower perceptability. However, in the case of EMU we
witness, rather, a concentration and an accumulation of the
political costs onto one party (the EU) only, i.e. an increase
in perceptibility. This is clearly a major reason for the lack
of popular support for European integration among the
peoples of Europe.
This may also backfire on the domestic level via the
following feed-back loops: the more successful the strategy
of scapegoating, the greater the loss of popularity of the
European common cause, the more difficult it is to run a
successful policy for integration at national level and,
consequently, the higher the proclivity of national
electorates to fall for nationalistic political ideologies.
4. Regaining Rather than Losing Sovereignty through
EMU
Standard arguments against EMU refer to the loss of
political sovereigny and the economic steering capacity
going with it. However, also this argument clearly misses
the point. The nation states of Europe long ago lost a large
share of their political sovereignty and parts of their
economic power of control over liberalized and
unrestricted global markets (Gretschmann, Heitzer-Susa
1997, pp. 327-330).
Globalization  has changed drastically the context
within which national policy-makers operate. Globalization
can be characterized as a loss of significance of physical,
fiscal, economic, technical, and other such boundaries. It
can be described as ‘interconnectedness’ determined by
the degree of ‘externalities and spill-overs’ resulting from
others’ decisions. This involves changes in the structure,
volume and distribution as well as in the efficiency of
national policy-making: traditional deficit spending to
stimulate the national economy of a country has become
inefficient by leading to higher demand for imports;
national tax policy has failed in the face of high international
mobility of tax bases; autonomous national monetary
policy has been rendered troublesome with perfectly
liberalized and voluminous financial markets (US $ 1,400
billion turnover a day in forex markets). These and other
examples demonstrate clearly that, in the face of global
interrelatedness, the national capacity to control has been
seriously reduced anyhow, i.e. even without political
integration.19
Against this background, international regimes (such
as EMU) must be reinterpreted as a means of regaining
political control (lost at the national level) at a higher
intergovernmental or supranational level. In this vein,
EMU will be able to contribute to an increase rather than
to a loss of political sovereignty vis-à-vis market forces.
This clearly contains as a component the strengthening
of Europe’s influence vis-à-vis the USA and Japan. As a
matter of fact, the period between 1950 and the present has
been characterized by the monetary hegemony of the US
dollar. The USA could afford to neglect the external
implications of its domestic monetary policy due to the
fact that the export share in US-GDP has remained
continuously at no more than about 9%. Therefore, sharp
movements of the US $ (ups and downs) did not really
impact on their domestic economic situation. Consequently,
the USA adopted an attitude of ‘benign neglect’ vis-à-vis
other countries in their foreign economic policy. They
abstained from taking into account how non-US currencies
were affected by dollar volatility. With a Single European
Currency in place, the European economies may be able to
form a counterweight challenging the US economic
hegemony on the monetary side (Benassy, Italianer,
Pissany-Ferry 1994). This will give all European
economies and polities a heavier weight in the economic
and political conflicts of interest in the 21st century
(Benassy-Quere 1996).
5. Conclusion
What our line of argument has displayed is that in fact
(monetary) integration has so far not sufficiently overcome
national interests and is still embedded in and constrained
by disparate (economic) beliefs and ideas of what kind of
Europe we should envisage. A fully-fledged and well-
functioning EMU would require the political will to steer
(fiscal and monetary) politics and policies in line with a,
still poorly defined, common interest and a, generally
accepted, common model. Considering the lack of these
conditions and taking into account the challenges which
the Union faces at the turn of the century, the conceptual,
theoretical and political foundations on which EMU has
been erected still appear rather shaky.
This problem is surely aggravated (a) by the fact that
national governments may be inclined to use the
scapegoating strategy as a means of domestic policy
making and (b) by a lack of recognition that EMU does not
really involve a loss of material sovereigny in the first
place, but rather offers the opportunity of regaining
political and economic steering capacity vis-à-vis global
markets.
It is no minor mishap that the creation of a sufficient
degree of convergence in models and beliefs has not
occurred on the route to EMU. It is this deficiency that
makes the creation of EMU so extremely difficult. The
convergence of common ideas and the moulding of a
common European ideal – today EMU rather presents
itself as a series of national deals – appears to us the most
important cornerstone of a successful EMU. It would give
EMU the necessary popular support among the European
peoples and the general public and it could help to shape
a new vision of European integration, a vision Europe
needs so badly on its way to the next millennium. ❑
NOTE
* The Maastricht Treaty, it will be remembered, stipulated the
following conditions for eligibility: an inflation rate of no
higher than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the
3 best performing countries; an interest rate (long-term) no
higher than 2 percentage points above the average of the 3
best inflation performing countries; a deficit of maximum
3% and a national debt level of 60% of national GDP. Our
own calculations and forecast yield the following prognosis
for 1997 (see table 1).
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Table 1: Criteria – Forecast 1997
Country Long-Term Deficit Deficit Level of
Interest Rates ---------------- ---------------- Public Debts
GDP ratios GDP ratios
(10 years
Government
Bonds) 1996 1997* 1997*
L 5.54 0.9 0.5 6.8
NL 5.63 2.4 2.3 77.2
F 5.67 4.1 3.3 58.0
A 5.74 4.3 2.0 67.2
D 5.75 3.8 3.3 61.5
B 5.84 3.4 3.0 126.9
FIN 6.13 2.6 2.0 59.4
DK 6.33 1.5 0.5 67.3
IRL 6.50 1.1 1.5 72.0
P 6.54 4.0 3.3 70.0
E 6.68 4.4 3.3 66.2
S 7.03 3.3 2.0 77.0
UK 7.12 4.1 3.0 55.5
I 7.35 6.8 3.5 122.4
GR 9.28 7.4 7.0 109.0
Spread 3.74 6.5 6.5 -